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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 15-1442 
______________ 
 
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST CO., 
as Trustee for WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-AR11-Trust 
 
v. 
 
JAMES W. HARDING, JR., his heirs, devisees, and personal representatives 
and his/her, their, or any of their successors in right, title and interest;  
MRS. HARDING, wife of James W. Harding, Jr., her heirs, devisees, and 
personal representatives and his/her, their, or any of their successors in  
right, title and interest; JOHN OLMO, his heirs, devisees, and personal 
representatives and his/her, their, or any of their successors in right, title  
or interest; CARALEE OLMO, his wife, her heirs, devisees, and personal 
representatives and his/her, their, or any of their successors in right, 
title and interest; WINDING CREEK AT OLD TAPPAN  
CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION INC. 
 
  James W. Harding, Jr.; John J. Olmo; Caralee Olmo, 
 
         Appellants 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 3-13-cv-02960) 
Honorable Peter G. Sheridan, District Judge 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 14, 2016 
 
BEFORE:  AMBRO, JORDAN, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  July 22, 2016) 
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______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
  
 Plaintiff-appellee originally filed this foreclosure action in a New Jersey state 
court, but defendants-appellants filed an answer with counterclaims and thereafter 
removed the case to the District Court.  Clearly, plaintiff did not object to the removal as  
it did not move to remand the case to the state court.  Ultimately, the parties filed cross-
motions for summary judgment and, after the District Court granted plaintiff’s motion 
and denied defendants’ motion in a January 20, 2015 order, defendants appealed.  We do 
not reach the merits of the issues raised on this appeal because in examining the District 
Court’s jurisdiction, see, e.g., In re Guild & Gallery Plus, Inc., 72 F.3d 1171, 1176 (3d 
Cir. 1996), we conclude that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and 
therefore the removal was improper.  Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s 
order on the summary judgment motions and will remand the case to that Court so that it, 
in turn, can remand the case to the state court where it should have remained.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 1447(c).  
 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), “any civil action brought in a State court of 
which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed 
by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district 
____________________ 
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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and division embracing the place where such action is pending.”  The statute thus 
authorizes the removal of a civil action from state court to federal court only “when the 
state-court action is one that could have been brought, originally, in federal court.”  
Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 81, 126 S.Ct. 606, 608 (2005).  In their notice 
of removal, defendants contended that this action originally could have been brought in a 
federal court because “the resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims will require adjudication of 
disputed questions of federal law.”  (A407 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331)).  Nevertheless, the 
record on appeal and the parties’ briefs make clear that there is no federal question 
jurisdiction in this matter.  Moreover, the parties do not contend that there is diversity of 
citizenship between the plaintiff and the defendants.  Therefore, the case must be 
remanded to the state court. 
 The Supreme Court has explained that a court determines if there is federal 
question jurisdiction in removal cases by use of the well-pleaded complaint rule, which 
provides that there is federal question jurisdiction only when the face of a properly 
pleaded complaint asserts a federal question.  Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 
392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429 (1987).  The face of the complaint in this case does not contain 
a basis on which federal question jurisdiction may be predicated.  Indeed, defendants, 
now appellants, assert in their brief that the federal question on which they rely for 
removal purposes “was presented . . . by way of a counterclaim that was filed by 
Appellants in response to the state court foreclosure complaint . . . .”  Appellants’ br. at 1; 
(A441-44).  But, as is well established, a federal question cannot be predicated on a 
defense or a counterclaim.  Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60, 129 S.Ct. 1262, 
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1272 (2009); Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830, 
122 S.Ct. 1889, 1893 (2002); see also Oak Knoll Vill. Condo. Owners’ Ass’n v. Jaye, 
No. 15-CV-5303, 2015 WL 4603715, at *2 (D.N.J. July 30, 2015) (“It is well-settled that 
a federal question appearing in a counterclaim is insufficient to establish federal question 
jurisdiction before this Court.”).   
 Inasmuch as the complaint in this case is a straightforward state-law foreclosure 
complaint, it does not provide a basis for federal question jurisdiction and thus this action 
could not have originally been brought in federal court.  Consequently, it was not 
removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).  We recognize, of course, that the parties have 
expended a considerable amount of time and resources litigating this case in the District 
Court.  Nevertheless, “subject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their 
own initiative even at the highest level.”  Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 
574, 583, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 1570 (1999).  Moreover, we have explained that “the party 
asserting federal jurisdiction in a removal case bears the burden of showing, at all stages 
of the litigation, that the case is properly before the federal court.”  Frederico v. Home 
Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 
770 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1985) (explaining that a “lack of [subject matter] jurisdiction 
would make any decree in the case void and the continuation of the litigation in federal 
court futile”).   
 Thus, even though the parties have expressed a desire for us to permit this case to 
remain in federal court, we cannot do so because there is not “a firm bedrock of 
jurisdiction” for this case.  Carlsberg Res. Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 554 F.2d 
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1254, 1256 (3d Cir. 1977).  The case must be remanded to the state court from which it 
was removed.  See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t., 523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 S.Ct. 
1003, 1012 (1998).  Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment of the District Court and 
will remand the case to that Court so that it can remand the case to the state court.   
